The probability of income loss depends on talent and e ort. E ort has positive externalities and therefore individuals are awarded status in proportion to their perceived diligence. The social norm requires more e ort from individuals perceived as more talented, but talent is private information and individuals cunningly choose e ort so as to manipulate the public perception of their talent. We analyze the workings of a social insurance system in this setting. It turns out that social norms may mitigate moral hazard. However, the distribution of social status in society will not be uniform.
Introduction
A welfare state provides insurance for its citizens. However, the greater the generosity of an insurance scheme, the less an insuree cares if a bad outcome occurs, and the less incentive he has to take adequate precautions. Such moral hazard considerations have received ample attention in the insurance economics literature. 1 However, it is seldom recognized that social norms may constrain behavior in the situations analyzed: A careless insuree typically shifts the costs of his behavior onto others and for this reason he may beaccorded low social status see Coleman 7, p.275 . 2 This is perhaps especially true if the insuree is conceived of as a talented fellow who, with high likelihood, could have avoided the bad outcome had he tried. To keep his status high, the insuree may therefore decide not to beso careless after all. On the other hand, if the social norm relates to perceived talent, the insuree may cunningly choose his actions so as to fake a level of talent such that others bestow high status on him.
In this paper we take a rst step towards analyzing issues of this kind. The analysis has some potential bearing on many kinds of insurance relationships, but in order to focus matters we phrase the presentation in terms of the following situation: A population of individuals di er in talent, which a ects how e ciently they transform e ort e.g., education or search activity into probability of getting a job. The individuals are risk averse and there is some scope for welfare enhancing unemployment insurance. However, the higher is the unemployment bene t, the less incentive there are for individuals to exert e ort, which i n t u r n raises unemployment r a t e s a t everyone's expense. "Lazy" behavior is therefore not socially approved, especially if a lazy person is regarded as having high talent. A social norm governs how m uch e ort an individual perceived to have a certain talent should exert, and this target is increasing in perceived talent. Social status is assumed to bean increasing function of the di erence between an individuals actual choice of e ort and the relevant target.
Individual talent is not easily inferred from outward appearances. We assume that each individual's talent is private information. Hence, others have t o d r a w their conclusions from observing choices of e ort only. This adds considerable intricacy to the motivation which a ects individual choices of e ort. Not only does e ort in uence employment probability, it also conveys a signal about personal talent, and this signal may b e manipulated. We solve the model using techniques from information economics. We apply an equilibrium re nement, a social equilibrium, which is akin to the D1 re nement of sequential equilibrium and show that there is a unique social equilibrium, which furthermore is fully separating.
In the social equilibrium there is for all levels of talent less moral hazard than would be the case if social status was not important. This nding is not a priori obvious, because although status is positively related to e ort for a given level of perceived talent, individuals also have the incentive to imitate less talented individuals by exterting less e ort. We also show that when the social insurance bene t is marginally increased individuals with low l e v els of talent will increase e ort, which is in sharp contrast to standard predictions. We conclude, however, that one should be cautious when making welfare judgements based on these results: People with low talent work hard even though the positive externality they create is small. Moreover, despite the social norm requiring more talented individuals to work harder, social status in the model is increasing in talent. Having social norms to reduce moral hazard is not a free lunch.
The paper is structured as follows. The model is introduced in Section 2 and solved for equilibrium behavior in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss the equilibrium in terms of moral hazard, marginal policy changes, and social status. We also discuss alternative m o d e l i n g c hoices. We conclude the paper in Section 5. An Appendix contains the proofs of some lemmata used to prove our main result. All gures are found at the end of the paper.
The model
We begin by describing in detail the model, discussing in turn its strategic structure 2.1, material payo s 2.2., social payo s 2.3 and individual objectives 2.4.
E ort, talent, unemployment
By exerting e ort x 2 X = 0 ; 1 individuals a ect their probability of getting employed. This e ort may have many interpretations, e.g., time or attention devoted to search activities on the labor market or to acquiring an education. Individuals di er according to their talent t 2 T = 0; 1 . There is a continuum of individuals whose talent is distributed on T according to the distribution function F, which is strictly increasing, continuously differentiable, and has a density function f. We focus on the case when each individual's level of talent is private information. However, F and f are com-mon knowledge among all individuals. An individual's probability of getting employed equals tx, and hence depends on both his e ort and his talent. 
Material payo s
An individual with a job has positive income from labor, normalized to one. 3 No private unemployment insurance exists but we assume there exists a public unemployment insurance system. The system is nanced through general public funds. The administrator of the insurance system only observes whether an individual has a job or not but is unable to observe an individual's talent o r e ort level. Since e ort is unobservable for the administrator unemployment insurance is a uniform unemployment bene t received by a n unemployed individual regardless of his talent and his ex ante chosen e ort to avoid unemployment.
In standard models that do not include social status concerns the individual's payo depends only on income from labor or social insurance minus the cost of e ort. We call this payo the material payo . Given talent t 2 T, e ort x 2 X, a n d social insurance bene t the material payo is given by
where the income valuation function u : R + ! R is normalized so that u0 = 0, u1 = 1, and satis es that u 0 0, u 00 0, u 0 ! +1 as y ! 0.
K is a positive constant large enough to guarantee any x = 1 is a strictly dominated strategy. An explicit restriction on K is speci ed in equation 5 in section 2.4.
Given our assumptions about u, for reasonable levels of the marginal cost of public funds, it is easy to nd a social welfare function such that some 2 0; 1 is the optimal bene t level. In the following we consider only such bene ts.
We close this subsection by recording how an individual of talent t motivated solely by his material payo would behave. He would choose x so as to maximize 1. Irrespective of the behavior of others, there is a unique such choice. The optimal choice for each t 2 T is described by the function x STD de ned by
Note that for all t 0 this speci cation entails moral hazard in the sense that the higher is , t h e lower will be x STD t.
Social norms and social payo s
Individuals care about social status which they bestow on one another. An individual's status depends on his choice of e ort and on how talented he is perceived to be. Although individual talent is private information it can be inferred from an individual's choice of e ort, which is observable to other individuals. The motivation for why e ort matters is that, with 0, an individual's e ort has positive external e ects, since e ort reduces the probability of income loss and social insurance bene ts are paid through public funds. Therefore, others may beinclined to despise a lazy individual and to hold a diligent individual in high esteem. 4 We assume that individuals are accorded zero social status if they are perceived of as maximizing their material payo . If they make some other choice, they are awarded status in proportion to the di erence between their actual choice of e ort and the choice of e ort that would maximize their material payo for the relevant l e v el of perceived talent. More speci cally, an individual who chooses e ort x and is perceived to have talent t 2 T is accorded a social status of x , x STD t and a social payo of x , x STD t, where is a non negative n umbercommon to all individuals measuring sensitivity to social status and x STD t is given by 2.We shall refer to x STD t as the social norm for an individual perceived to have talent t. 5 It remains to be explained how perceptions of an individual's talent come about. Individuals have private information about their own talent, so others can only draw inferences based on observations of the complete vector of chosen actions across the population. 6 We adapt standard tools of information economics which guarantee that, in equilibrium, all individuals make t h e 4 If the reduction of government spending is per se something all persons desire, the following quote from Coleman 7, p.274 captures the spirit of our modeling: I f a n umber of persons' interests are satis ed by the same outcome, then each has an incentive t o r e w ard the others for working toward that outcome. Each m a y i n fact nd it in his interest to establish a norm toward working for that outcome, with negative sanctions for shirking and positive sanctions for working toward the common goal." 5 A similar approach to modeling social status is used by Kandel & Lazear 16 . 6 This aspect resembles Bernheim's 3 model of conformity, except that in his model same inferences if an individual with a certain talent takes a certain action. The details are discussed in Section 3. For the time beingwe postulate the existence of an inference function which, for each level of talent and action chosen, speci es a perceived talent. Let : X ! T denote such a function; x 2 T is the perceived talent o f a n individual who chooses e ort x 2 X. In order to make x = 1 a strictly dominated choice we assume that
5 The interpretation is that no individual nds it worthwhile to spend all his time to reduce the risk of losing income.
We note that these preferences satisfy the so called single crossing property. To see this consider the slope of indi erence curves given by
and the decrease in slope over talents
the counterpart to our social norm is constant o ver types. Our model furthermore shares with Bernheim's the feature that individuals care directly about other's inferences. The resulting signaling game is non standard; usually the inferring parties take actions about which others are concerned. However, as noted by Bernheim 3, footnote 6 , the assumption we make has no formal signi cance and the analysis can be recast in more traditional ways.
Social equilibrium
We solve the model for equilibrium behavior, requiring that individuals of all talents maximize total payo s given the equilibrium inference function. Furthermore, the inference function must be reasonable in the following two ways. First, the perceived talent associated with any e ort level chosen by some individual in equilibrium should correspond to the expected level of talent of the individuals making that equilibrium choice. This means that if, in some equilibrium, the e ort level x is chosen only by individuals with talent t, then x = t. If, on the other hand, individuals of many di erent talentspoolatx, then the inference gives the expected talent of an individual drawn at random from the pool. Second, we impose a requirement on inferences concerning choices of e ort that do not occur in equilibrium. To motivate this suppose for a moment that such a requirement i s not imposed. Consider the strategy pro le where each individual, irrespective of his talent, chooses an e ort level of 1 K 1 , u + . This means that all individuals poolat the level of e ort which would maximize the total payo of the most talented individual had his talent been common knowledge. 7 For high enough, this pro le is sustained as an equilibrium by the inference function , de ned by is perceived to have a talent equal to the expected talent of an individual drawn at random from the whole population and no individual dares to deviate because he would automatically be perceived as the individual with the highest talent, even for deviation towards lower levels of e ort! We nd such an equilibrium questionable becauseit is founded on questionable out of equilibrium inferences. The problem is very similar to that which arises in signaling games when the sequential equilibrium concept is applied. In that context, a standard reaction is to invoke an equilibrium re nement which restricts possible inferences concerning out of equilibrium actions. The equilibrium re nement we apply is an adaptation of the D1 equilibrium see Cho & Kreps 6 and cf. Bernheim 3 . In the context of the present model the D1 criterion mandates that the inference concerning any out of equilibrium action mu s t b e o n a t a l e n t l e v el of an individual with the strongest incentive to deviate under that particular inference. Compare this inference with the previous example where the out of equilibrium inference was on the talent level of the individual with the weakest incentive to deviate! We now de ne the concept of social equilibrium, which we shall use to solve the model when 0 and 2 0; 1. Let x SE : T ! X bea function which describes which e ort levels are chosen by individuals with di erent talents in the social equilibrium. We refer to the image of x SE as equilibrium e orts" and to complementary e ort levels as out of equilibrium e orts". Condition i in the De nition requires optimality o f chosen actions, conditions ii and iii correspond to the requirements on the inference function discussed before. 8 We now solve the model:
Theorem. There exists a unique social equilibrium x SE ; SE . x SE is continuous and strictly increasing full separation, strictly convex, and satis es To p r o ve the Theorem we will make use of the following four lemmata, which apply to any social equilibrium x SE ; SE proofs in the appendix: Lemma 1. If t t 0 , then x SE t x SE t 0 . Lemma 2. If x x 0 , then SE x SE x 0 . Lemma 3. The set of equilibrium e orts is connected. 8 A social equilibrium is not formally equivalent to a D1 equilibrium because condition ii of the De nition is not quite Bayes' rule and iii is not the D1 criterion. These changes are made to simplify the presentation of ii, and because we prefer the economic intuition behind iii to that of the D1 criterion. Both changes are inconsequential to equilibrium behavior. In particular, in our game iii and the D1 criterion a ect behavior in the same way.
Lemma 4. No pool exists, i.e., @t; t 0 2 T s.t. t 6 = t 0 , x SE t = x SE t 0 .
These lemmata show in turn that the equilibrium e ort and inference functions x SE and SE are monotone, that the e ort levels chosen in equilibrium form a connected set, and that there are no pools.
Proof of the Theorem: 9 Combining Lemmata 1, 3, and 4 one sees that x SE must be strictly increasing and continuous. Moreover, x SE must be di erentiable; in order to prescribe equilibrium choices for all talents x SE must for each t be tangent to an indi erence curve as given by 6, and this would be impossible if x SE had a kink" either there would beno point of tangency at the kink and individuals with talent t would want to deviate, or there would be multiple tangencies at the kink and a pool would be attracted.
For equilibrium e orts, SE is the inverse of x SE , and hence SE must there bedi erentiable too. Hence we can proceed by maximizing 4 with respect to x to get the rst order condition 0 x = K 1,u t+ ,K x 1,u . Since inferences are correct we can substitute x for t to get
This is a linear rst order di erential equation which can be solved by standard methods. However, we need an initial condition. Since in a separating equilibrium true talents are revealed, the individual with talent 1 will have that highest conceivable social norm apply to him, and this could never be consistent with equilibrium behavior unless he chooses the e ort level that would be optimal for him had his level of talent been commonly know. Substituting a 1 for x in 4, and maximizing with respect to x one concludes that he chooses an e ort of 1 K 1 , u + , so the appropriate initial condition is describes the equilibrium inference function SE for equilibrium levels of e ort. Since equilibrium e orts increase with talent Lemma 1 + separation, e ort levels above x SE 1 = 1 K 1,u + are irrelevant in 9.
Moreover, e ort levels below x SE 0 are irrelevant. By Lemma 2, SE x = 0 for any x 2 0; x SE 0 and SE x = 1 for any x 2 x SE 1; 1 .
x SE is the inverse of SE for equilibrium e ort levels. Hence substituting t for x and x SE t for x in 9 we get the following expression which implicitly de nes equilibrium e orts for all talents in T: The e ort choices in the social equilibrium given by 10 are illustrated in Figure 2 . The graphs I t and I 1 display the indi erence curves for the individuals with talent levels t and 1 which are tangent to x SE . The points of tangency are then t; x SE t and 1; x SE 1. The inference function SE is illustrated by Figure 3 .
Discussion
In this section we analyse the social equilibrium in terms of moral hazard, marginal policy changes, and social status. We also discuss some possible alternative modeling choices.
Moral hazard
We de ne moral hazard as the change in individual e ort caused by the introduction of social insurance. We assume that social status is important only because e ort has negative externalities when 0. Then, with = 0 social status is unimportant and = 0. We refer to the situation with = = 0 as autarchy AUT . In autarchy individuals choose e ort so as to maximize 1 with = 0, in which case e ort is given by x AUT t = t K .
Hence our measure of moral hazard for an individual of talent t in the social equilibrium is x AUT t,x SE t. We n o w compare this measure to two others which would berelevant under di erent assumptions than those pertaining to the social equilibrium.
First, there is the case described by the standard model where individuals are motivated solely material payo so that 0, = 0. In this case e orts are given by x STD as de ned in 2 S TDmeans "standard" and suggests that social status concerns are suppressed The relevant moral hazard measure in this case is x AUT t , x STD t = t K u .
We n o w compare the moral hazard measures in the social equilibrium and the standard model. A special case, when is not too large, is illustrated in Figures 4a b. In the social equilibrium moral hazard x AUT t , x SE t i s negative at the lower end of the distribution of talents. Moral hazard then increases with talent up to some point, where it tapers o a bit. This is in sharp contrast to the standard prediction where the measure of moral hazard x AUT t , x STD t is never negative, and zero only for individuals with zero talent. In the social equilibrium, if is not too high, there will bepositive moral hazard for some individuals with high enough talent, but never will moral hazard beashigh as in the standard model. Second, there is the case where social status is important but information about talent is common knowledge among individuals there is complete information C I about each individual's t. Then individuals choose e ort so as to maximize 4 with a t substituted for x and e ort is given by x C I t = 1 K , 1,u t+ . In this case the moral hazard measure becomes x AUT t , x C I t = t K u , K .
We now compare the social equilibrium to the model with complete information, and again Figures 4a b illustrate a special case when is not too large. Moral hazard is never lower in the social equilibrium than in the case with complete information. The di erence in moral hazard between the two cases decreases with talent, and for the most talented individual there is no di erence at all.
Summing up, there is unambiguously less moral hazard in the social equilibrium than in the standard case. This nding was not a priori obvious, because although e ort per se tends to increase individuals' status, there was the counter e ect that individuals might try to fake their level of talent by shading e ort choices. Such an e ect indeed is important, as witnessed by the fact that there is more moral hazard in the social equilibrium than in the case with complete information. Still, social norms may to some extent alleviate free riding. 10 However, one should becautious in terms of judging the welfare implications of this nding. In the social equilibrium individuals of low talent work hard even though the positive externality they create is small. 11 Especially for populations where f has a fat bottomtail, this may seem socially undesirable.
Marginal policy changes
We n o w consider the e ect of a marginal change in the bene t level holding constant the social preference parameter . The conclusion of the standard model, as well as the model with complete information, is that e ort is reduced when the bene t level is increased, except for individuals of talent zero whose e ort is una ected by the social insurance bene t. By contrast, in the social equilibrium there will be a "cuto level of talent" in 0; 1 such that all individuals with talents below this level will increase e ort, and all individuals with talents above will decrease e ort when the bene t level is increased. This is illustrated in Figure 5 .
With an eye to 10 we somewhat loosely speaking explain this as follows. The right h a n d s i d e o f 10 is the sum of two terms, each representing a di erent "e ect". The rst term represents the direct incentive to scale down e ort as a reaction to reduced material incentives. The strength of this e ect increases with talent, and hence by itself tends to make x SE more at. The second e ect mirrors the altered incentives to adjust e ort so as to reach a desired level of social status. Since the rst e ect tends to make x SE more at, a marginal increase of e ort will tend to bring about a less drastic increase in the relevant social norm. Therefore, the incentives to increase e ort go up. By inspection of 10, one sees that the higher is an individuals talent the less important is the second e ect. In fact, the second e ect is irrelevant to the individual with talent equal to 1. Since the two e ects work in opposite directions and apply di erently to individuals of di erent talents the explanation follows.
Social status
In the social equilibrium where inferences are correct the social status of an individual with talent t is endogenously determined and equal to the di erence between the actually chosen e ort and the choice of e ort which would maximize that individual's material payo . That is, the individual's social status rank is measured by is x SE t , x STD t. One might have expected that social status in equilibrium would be the same for individuals of all talents; after all, the social norms are sensitized to individual talents. However, as illustrated by Figure 4c , this is not the case. In the social equilibrium, social status increases with talent.
Again, this is a result that suggests that one must proceed cautiously if one wants to discuss welfare issues. In our model, social status is systematically lower for people with low talent than for peoplewith high talent, and this may be important i f t h e w elfare of an economy is assessed. Having social norms to reduce moral hazard is not a free lunch. 12 
Alternative approaches
There are several ways in which one might modify or augment the model in this paper and we now mention a few of these: We assume that 0 if and only if 0, without considering elaborate connections that may seem natural. For example, there may be some speci c presumably monotone relationship between and . Investigating such a connection could be particularly interesting if government is introduced as a player who chooses . Moreover, there may besome inertia associated with the formation of or the social norm, so that if government suddenly changes , then or the social norm adjust only slowly.
The social preference parameter is exogenously given and independent of the action pro le chosen by the population in the model. As an alternative, could be a function of the e ort choices in society. 13 Yet another possibility is that , a s w ell as the nature of the social norm itself, could be determined by forces of natural selection. 14 The concept of social equilibrium presumes that individual talent is private information, while e ort choice are observable for other individuals. We have not explored other observability assumptions, although we note that there are alternatives: Individuals could also observe each other's average 12 Cf. Besley & Coate 4 who model the take u p o f w elfare where the associated stigma in equilibrium depends on the di erence between the average type of all claimants of welfare and the average type of deserving poor claimants. With dichotomous choice their model implies statistical discrimination. In our model information about deservability" is by contrast inferred from observed behavior. 13 Cf. the models of Kandel and Lazear 16 where average e ort matters and Lindbeck et al 17 or Bird 5 where the social payo associated with some action is inversely related to the number of individuals choosing that action.
14 Cf. G uth & Yaari 15 who introduce the indirect evolutionary approach", in which individuals behave as rational agents for given preferences, but where preferences selected by e v olution. Fershtman & Weiss 12 apply such a n a p p r o a c h to analyze the evolutionary stability of certain social preferences. unemployment spells i.e., xt or whether an individual is unemployed or employed. What assumption is reasonable depends on the interpretation of e ort. At least if e ort is education we think our assumption is reasonable, but nevertheless it may b e interesting to explore other possibilitues.
Finally we mention that techniques related to those used in this paper can probably be applied to many di erent economic problems. To assume that a social norm depends on perceived individual ability seems to be very reasonable when one analyzes problems of team production, pro t sharing, work cooperatives, etc.
We think that it would be interesting to extend the model in any of these directions. However, we leave such tasks for future research.
Conclusions
We analyze the relation between social norms and moral hazard in an unemployment insurance context. An individual's e ort to get a job has positive externalities by reducing public expenditure on unemployment bene ts, and therefore lazy" behavior is not socially approved. A social norm governs how m uch e ort an individual perceived to have a certain talent s h o u l d exert, and this norm is increasing in perceived talent. Individuals care about what others think about their observed behavior, and therefore the model contains social incentives in addition to standard material incentives. It is not a priori clear how the social incentives a ect behavior. On the one hand, for a given level of perceived talent, an individual's status increases with his e ort. On the other hand, perceived talent depends on e ort and so individuals may reduce their e ort choices in order to manipulate others' perception of their talent.
Using techniques from information economics we solve the model for a unique equilibrium which is fully separating. Despite the counteracting social incentives, in this equilibrium there is unambiguously less moral hazard than without the social norms. Moreover, marginal increases of the social insurance bene t lead all individuals with low enough talents to increase their e ort. These conclusions stand in contrast to standard predictions. However, since people with low talents work hard even though the positive externality they create is small, and since social status is still systematically lower for them than for people with high talent, we conclude that one should be cautious when making welfare judgements based on our results. the lowest equilibrium e ort choice above x. By b in the proof of Lemma 2 and De nition iii one sees that SE x has a uniquely determined value. By continuity of total payo s in talent, one infers that ux; SE x; SE x = ux; SE x; SE x = ux; SE x; SE x = 0. These equalities cannot hold unless SE x 6 = SE x 6 = SE x, since material payo s are strictly concave in e ort. And then, by Lemma 2, SE x SE x SE x. If x is an equilibrium e ort, this is impossible; any individual of talent t 2 T with x SE t = x would gain by choosing x , " 2 X for " small enough. If x is an out of equilibrium e ort there must exist ' 0 such that x; x + ' is a set of equilibrium e orts for which no pooling occurs. This too is impossible; there would exist with 0 ' such that SE x + 2 T would gain by c hoosing x. Hence no SE exist which sustains x SE ; SE as a social equilibrium, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose Lemma 4 is not true. Then there exists t; t 0 2 T such that t 6 = t 0 and x SE t = x SE t 0 . By Lemma 1 we can nd a connected set T of talents pooling at x SE t. Let t; t be the in mum and supremum of . By De nition ii, t SE x SE t t. It is impossible that x SE t 0 since then we can nd " 0 small enough that individuals with talent t + " 2 w ould gain by choosing x SE t , " the loss of material payo is arbitrarily small and outweighed by a substantial social payo gain. Hence it must be that x SE t = 0. However, this is impossible too. To see this note rst that = 0; 1 is impossible; 1 2 T would deviate and choose e ort level 1,ub+ K , where he has positive material payo instead of zero and zero social payo instead of negative. Hence, if pooling occurs at e ort 0, also other choices are made in equilibrium. By Lemma 3 these choices are all connected. But then we can nd an equilibrium e ort " 2 X, " 0 but small enough that no pooling occurs at any e ort level in the set 0; " . An individual with talent t SE " c hooses ", but he in fact can gain by deviating to e ort 0 again the loss of material payo is arbitrarily small and outweighed by a substantial social payo gain. Hence there can be no pool, a contradiction. 
